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STUDENT ARTICLES
ORIENTATION-BASED PERSECUTION AS GROUNDS




In July 1993, Marcelo Tenorio, a Brazilian national, was
granted political asylum based solely on the persecution his sex-
ual orientation invited.' Ruling in Tenorio's case, Immigration
Judge Philip Leadbetter explained, "[a] nti gay groups appear to
be prevalent in Brazilian society and continue to commit vio-
lence against homosexuals, with little official investigation and
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Scholar, 1993 - 1995; J.D. Candidate, 1995, Notre Dame Law School. The
author thanks Professors John Robinson, Sabrina McCarthy, Barbara
Gasperetti, and Librarian Patti Ogden for assistance with this article.
1. See In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (EOIR Immigr. Court July 26,
1993). Marcelo Tenorio, age 30, fled his native Brazil after a gang of youths
brutalized him outside a gay bar because of his sexual orientation and
threatened to kill him if they ever saw him again. Although Brazil (particularly
Rio de Janeiro) has a reputation for "acceptance" of homosexual lifestyles,
Tenorio's star witness, anthropologist Luis Mott, testified that he personally has
documented 1,200 slayings of homosexuals and transvestites in Brazil during
the past 13 years. Further, Mott attested, the police seldom investigate these
slayings, and the perpetrators of crimes against gays generally receive light
sentences. See Gay Brazilian Claims Persecution - Wins U.S. Asylum, S.F. CHRON.,
July 29, 1993, at A19; Gay's Request for Asylum based on Sex Persecution: Brazilian
Talks of Dangers of Going Back Home, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 1993, at A13. See also
Stuart Grider, Comment, Sexual Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the United
States, 35 I-L&v. IrT'L L.J. 213 (1994) (discussing the Tenorio decision).
One year after Marcelo Tenorio received political asylum on the grounds
of his sexual orientation, a San Francisco Asylum Officer granted asylum to
"Jose Garcia" (pseudonym), a Mexican man who endured persecution due to
his sexual orientation. "Garcia" stated: "As a gay man in Mexico, life was made
intolerable for me... I had no one to turn to." Gay Man Who Cited Abuse in
Mexico is Granted Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 1994. This marked the first time
an officer at this level granted asylum on the basis of sexual orientation.
REFUGEE REPORTS, Mar. 31, 1994, at 13.
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few criminal charges being brought against the perpetrators."
2
Judge Leadbetter's ruling in the Tenorio case is noteworthy for
two reasons: first, because it acknowledges that violence against
homosexuals is ignored and perhaps supported by governmental
officials in foreign countries, and second, because it creates the
possibility that other aliens will apply for and receive asylum
based solely on their orientation-based persecution, thus poten-
tially increasing the number of asylum applicants in an already
overburdened system.'
This Article will argue that, as Judge Leadbetter properly
realized, homosexuals are members of a "social group" for pur-
poses of refugee law. Because the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) has appealed Judge Leadbetter's decision,
Tenorio's safety could be short-lived.4 Thus, this Article will sug-
gest an appropriate policy response to the growing reports of vio-
lence against homosexuals in other countries which have been
presented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the
international press. In so doing, it will explore the United States'
legal and ethical obligations to grant asylum to those who satis-
factorily prove a "well founded fear of persecution." Moreover,
in the context of orientation-based persecution,5 this Article's
policy recommendations will acknowledge the inherent conflict
between "compassion and control," the INS' recently articulated
twin goals for asylum reform.6
I. THE LAW OF ASYLUM SEEKING
The rights and status of asylum seekers are governed by two
documents: the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and
the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees. Both documents
were negotiated by the United Nations (UN) and are adminis-
2. In re Tenorio, No. A72 093 558 (EOIR Immigr. Court July 26, 1993).
3. See Lizette Alvarez & Lisa Getter, Asylum the Magic Key: U.S. Ill-Equipped
to Weed Out Opportunists, MIAMI HERAt, Dec. 15, 1993, at IA (America's asylum
system is overloaded, unsophisticated, and abused).
4. See Grider, supra note 1, at 213.
5. I use the term "orientation-based persecution" to encompass all
governmentally initiated, supported or ignored acts of persecution which are
directed at an individual due to his or her actual or perceived homosexuality.
6. See Asylum Seekers FHooding U.S. - System Unable to Cope with Huge Claims,
ARIzONA REPUBUC, Apr. 25, 1993, at A26. Reacting to the news that one of the
suspects in the World Trade Center bombing entered the United States by
requesting asylum, Congress began hearings on proposals for reducing the
number of refugees waiting for their claims to be processed. Gregg A. Beyer,
Director of Asylum at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, admitted
that his organization "lacks both compassion and control," and emphasized the
need to "balance" the two goals during asylum reform. Id
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tered today by the UN's High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). The 1951 Convention limited protection to those
affected by World War II. Later, the 1967 Protocol incorporated
the 1951 Convention, and also extended ?rotection to asylum
seekers outside the World War II context. The United States
was not a signatory of the 1951 Convention, but it did consent to
several of the 1951 Convention's terms when it signed the 1967
Protocol in 1969.
The 1967 Protocol defines a refugee as any person, who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country;
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.
8
Although several elements of the refugee definition have been
the subject of interpretive debate,9 this Article is limited to inter-
pretations of "social group," and, specifically, to whether the
social group category includes individuals with real or perceived
homosexual orientation who are persecuted. 10 Further, this Arti-
cle will discuss only those instances of persecution which homo-
sexuals suffer solely on account of their membership in a social
7. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S.
267-77.
8. This definition is codified at INA sec. 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42) (1988).
9. There exists a complex body of law in which the United States Board of
Immigration Appeals and the Federal Courts have attempted to clarify the
meaning of terms such as "persecution" and "political opinion." See, e.g., I.N.S.
v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992); M.A. v. I.N.S., 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1990); Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-
Hernandez v. I.N.S., 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984); Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F.
Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, No. A27 549 626 (BIA
Jan. 21, 1988).
10. (Orientation-based) "persecution" can take three forms:
First, the "most obvious" form of persecution is the "abuse of human rights
by organs of the state, such as the police or the military." Such actors are
known as 'agents of persecution." JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REF GEE
STATUS 125 (1991). Second, the abuse of human rights by actors connected
with the government, such as 'thugs" or party members acting in concert with
those in power, is clearly persecutory. Id. at 126. Third, persecution may arise
through 'the failure or the inability of a government effectively to protect the
basic human rights of its populace." Id. at 127.
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group, not persecution that might be endured on account of
political opinions about homosexual issues.1
Congress has not defined the meaning of "social group";
rather, it has simply codified existing international obligations
into domestic law. The definitional language of the 1967 Proto-
col was enacted without change into the United States Code
through the Refugee Act of 1980.12 The Refugee Act charges the
Attorney General of the United States with establishing proce-
dures to determine asylum status, and directs the observance of
the Immigration and Nationality Act's criteria for determining
eligibility.'
3
Persons who are found eligible as refugees and asylees are
entitled to "non-refoulement," whereby the United States may
not return them to the country where they face persecution. 14 In
addition to the critical entitlement of non-refoulement, refugees
receive other important entitlements, which include religious
freedom,15 exemption from exceptional measures taken against
nationals of the refugee's country of origin,' 6 acquisition of
11. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has established that, in that
circuit, members of a group with common characteristics who resist
governmental abuse of their group may satisfy the "political opinion" category
of the statute, even when their "social group" claim is not successfully offered.
See Lazo-Majano v. I.N.S., 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). In Lazo-Majano, the
petitioner was a Salvadoran woman who fled her country after she was
repeatedly raped by her employer, a low-ranking Salvadoran military official.
When she appealed from the BIA's denial of her asylum application, the Ninth
Circuit reversed, stating:
[p]ersecution is stamped on every page of this record. . . if the
situation is seen in its social context, [the employer] is asserting the
political opinion that a man has a right to dominate and he has
persecuted [the petitioner] to force her to accept this opinion without
rebellion... [she] was not permitted... to hold an opinion to the
contrary. When by flight, she asserted one, she became exposed to
persecution for her assertion. Persecution threatened her because of
her political opinion.
Id. at 1434-35.
12. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980)
[hereinafter Refugee Act], codified at Immigration and Naturalization Act
(INA) §§ 101(a)(42), 207-209, 243(h), 411-414 [hereinafter INA], 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-59, 1253(h), 1521-1524 (1988).
13. Id. An alien admitted to the United States pursuant to sec. 207 is
called a "refugee." An alien who is admitted to the United States pursuant to a
finding that he or she meets the refugee definition in § 101(a) (42) is called an
"asylee."
14. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, 176 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
15. Id, at art. 4.
16. Id. at art. 8.
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moveable and immovable property, 17 protection of intellectual
property rights,"8 free association, 19 access to national courts, °
the right to work,21 equal access to rationed supplies, 22 equal
access to housing,23 public relief,24 social security,25 freedom of
movement, 26 free transfer of assets,
27 recognition of marriage, 28
and protection from expulsion.
29
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The regulations which implement section 208 of the INA
provide three procedures whereby an applicant may request asy-
lum. The application process begins either when an alien volun-
tarily surrenders to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), or when he or she is arrested after entering the United
States illegally. If the applicant voluntarily surrenders at a land
border or port of entry, and if exclusion and deportation pro-
ceedings have not yet begun against the applicant, he or she may
first apply for asylum protection with an INS District Director."°
If this initial attempt is unsuccessful, an applicant may resubmit
his or her application to an Immigration Judge in subsequent
exclusion or deportation proceedings.3 " In the alternative, if
exclusion or deportation proceedings have begun before the
applicant requests asylum for the first time, he or she may submit
the first request directly to an Immigration Judge.32
Decisions of an Immigration Judge regarding deportation"3
are subject to administrative review by the Board of Immigration
17. Id at art. 13.
18. IM. at art. 14.
19. Id. at art. 15.
20. Id. at art. 16.
21. Id. at arts. 17-19.
22. Id. at art. 20.
23. Id. at art. 21.
24. Id. at art. 23.
25. Id. at art. 24.
26. Id. at art. 26.
27. Id. at art. 30.
28. Id. at art. 12.
29. Id at art.. 32.
30. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(A) (1994).
31. Id., §§ 208.2(B), 208.18
32. Id., § 208.2(B).
33. Deportation proceedings are initiated against aliens who have
entered the United States to determine whether they should be expelled from
the country. The term "entry" means "any coming of an alien into the U.S.
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily
or otherwise..." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (13) (1988). The term is furthermore
defined as:
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Appeals 4 ("BIA") and judicial review in the courts of appeals.3 5
Decisions regarding exclusion 36 are subject to administrative
review by the BIA and to judicial review through habeas corpus
petition to a district court.37 From the federal courts, an unsuc-
cessful party may petition the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. When an applicant using any of these methods
is successful, he or she is eligible to apply for permanent resi-
dence in the United States after one year elapses.3 8
III. VIOLENCE AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS: "BREAKING THE SILENCE"
In February 1994, Amnesty International, a prominent
NGO, published "Breaking the Silence,"39 a report documenting
incidents of orientation-based violence in various countries. This
report and numerous others ° demonstrate that orientation-
based persecution is a frequent and serious form of persecution
which can and does instill a "well founded fear" in the hearts of
many foreign nationals. Orientation-based persecution takes
many forms, Amnesty International reveals, ranging from "subtle
discrimination and everyday hostility by agents of government to
outright imprisonment, torture, and execution."41 These
accounts foreshadow an increased number of asylum claims
which, like Marcelo Tenorio's, can be brought only under the
"membership in a particular social group" category.
Buttressing Amnesty's point, a recent country-by-country sur-
vey of lesbian and gay liberation and oppression provides a
shocking look at the magnitude of orientation-based persecu-
tion." That survey reported that of 178 countries studied, only 6
1. A crossing into the territorial limits of the U.S., i.e., physical
presence;
2. An inspection and admission by an immigration officer; or
3. Actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest
inspection point; coupled with
4. Freedom from restraint.
IRAJ. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 21 (2d ed. 1991).
34. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1994).
35. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1988).
36. Exclusion proceedings are initiated against aliens who seek entry and
admission into the United States at its borders. An excludable alien is not
considered to have entered the U.S. KURZBAN, supra note 33, at 21.
37. INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(b) (1988).
38. INA § 209(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1988).
39. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BREAKING THE SILENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION (1994).
40. See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
41. See AM, sn' INTERNATIONAL, supra note 39, at 11.
42. Rob Tielman and Hans Hammelburg, World Survey on the Social and
Legal Position of Gays and Lesbians, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND REFUGEE STATUS
have enacted laws which protect gay men and lesbians from dis-
crimination by the government and private citizens. In 74 of
those 178 countries, homosexual behavior is illegal. In some
countries where homosexuality is illegal, homosexual acts are
punishable by prison sentences and even the death penalty.
Even where homosexuals are not legally subject to execution,
though, their lives may be nonetheless threatened. In India,
where homosexual acts are outlawed, there are reports of raids
by the police in Bombay, where persons are arrested for no other
reason than that they "look like" homosexuals. 4- The Indone-
sian embassy reports that in that country "there is no mentioning
of homosexuals, lesbians, or heterosexuals concerning Indone-
sian legislation," yet the embassy acknowledges police raids and
police violence against homosexual men."
From a legal perspective, homosexuals fare the worst in
Islamic countries and in Africa.45 In Iran, the government is
quite forthcoming about the danger homosexuals face under its
legal system. Its embassy stated that "[h]omosexuality in Iran,
treated according to the Islamic law, is a sin in the eyes of God
and a crime for society. In Islam, generally, homosexuality is
among the worst possible sins you can imagine."46 In accordance
with this official condemnation of homosexuals, the Islamic
penal code provides that homosexuality is punishable by "whip-
ping, chopping off hands and feet, and stoning."47 Further, that
code gives a judge considerable latitude with respect to alterna-
tive punishments, and it is considered dangerous to defend an
accused homosexual in Iran.48
The publication of "Breaking the Silence" marks a signifi-
cant change in the acknowledgement of orientation-based per-
secution. Although homosexuals were among the groups
persecuted by the Nazis during World War II, and thus are argua-
bly among those groups the original Convention sought to pro-
tect, refugee law has not to date protected homosexuals as it has
other persecuted groups.49 Despite its role as a prominent, grass-
roots international human rights organization, even Amnesty
International itself has not devoted significant attention to orien-
LESBIAN AND GAY LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 249-342 (Aart Hendricks et al.,
eds., 1993) [hereinafter THIRD PINK BOOK].
43. Id. at 290.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 250-51.
46. Id. at 291.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 292,
49. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 39, at 8.
1995]
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tation-based persecution until recently. Amnesty began to
acknowledge certain forms of homophobic persecution in 1979,
when it acknowledged those imprisoned for homosexual acts as
"prisoners of conscience," and later, in 1982, Amnesty specifically
condemned the forcible medical treatment endured by prisoners
to "change" their sexual orientation.5 ° Now, it has joined with
the international press to reveal countless incidents of govern-
mentally sponsored or ignored violence against gays.
Recently the international press has reported that in Peru,
the government itself has openly sponsored persecution of gays,
even those who hold high office. In 1993, Carlos Hiqueras, a 31-
year member of the Peruvian foreign service and former ambas-
sador to Cuba and Yugoslavia, was abruptly fired along with 117
other diplomats when President Alberto Fujimori purged his gov-
ernment of those with "questionable ethics."51 By contrast, in
1991, the "Black Hand," a Colombian outlaw group with a plan
to eradicate elements of society that it opposes, shot to death at
least 40 people, among them known homosexuals.5 2
Not only has orientation-based persecution received consid-
erable coverage by the international press and Amnesty Interna-
tional, the mistreatment of homosexual persons has also been
acknowledged recently by the UN itself. In 1993 the Interna-
tional Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) was granted the right
to consult and lobby the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC). As the problem of violence against homosexuals
emerges as a legitimate international concern, what also emerges
is the need to include homosexuals among those persons who
may seek refuge from their horror through the asylum system.54
50. 1I at 5.
51. Opposition Says Peru Moving Toward Dictatorship, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 24, 1993.
52. "Black Hand" Kills 12 in Campaign Against Social Ills, REUTER, Nov. 25,
1991.
53. Larry King Live (CNN Television Broadcast, Oct. 13, 1993), available in
Lexis News Library, CNN File. Julie Dorf, ILGA's Executive Director, explains
the benefits of ECOSOC status:
[T] he Economic and Social Council is the main human rights arm of
the United Nations, and ILGA has consultative status, along with 3,000
other non-governmental organizations - actually the lowest-level status
- and has the right to present its opinions about various human rights
issues.
Id.
54. Amnesty concludes its report on orientation-based persecution with a
recommendation to "review and revise (or repeal where necessary) all barriers,
whether in law or administrative practice, to persons seeking political asylum on
the basis of persecution based upon sexual identity." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 39, at 43.
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IV. UNITED STATES SociAL GROUP JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO
THE TENORro CASE
There are few sources of guidance for courts to use in deter-
mining which groups should be recognized by the United States
under the "social group" category. As commentators have recog-
nized, "[t ] he legislative history behind the phrase 'membership in
a particular social group' is uninformative."5 The drafters of the
Convention originally did not include "particular social group"
as one of the categories of people eligible for refugee status.5 6 It
appears that the category was added as an afterthought at the
urging of the Swedish delegate.57 The Convention seemingly
added "social group" to the categories as a "safety net" 8 for asy-
lum seekers who should qualify for refugee status but fail to fall
neatly into one of the enumerated categories.5 9
As noted above, the UNHCR administers the Convention's
provisions. Its Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status (Handbook), which offers guidelines for interpret-
ing the categories in the refugee definition, advises the following
with respect to "social group":
A 'particular social group' normally comprises persons of
similar background, habits, or social status. A claim to fear
of persecution under this heading may frequently overlap
with a claim to fear of persecution on other grounds, i.e.,
race, religion, or nationality.... Membership of such a
particular social group may be at the root of persecution
55. See T. David Parish, Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under
the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 923 (1992).
Other commentators have adopted a more optimistic view. See Daniel
Compton, Note, Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: A Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar,
62 WASH. L. Ruv. 913, 917 (1987) (interpreting the lack of comment on the
addition of "particular social group" to mean that the new category was readily
embraced by the drafters).
56. Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons at 12, U.N.
Doc. E/AC.32/L.40 (1950).
57. Sture Petren, the Swedish delegate to the Convention, offered:
In the first place, experience had shown that certain refugees had
been persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups.
The draft Convention made no provision for such cases, and one
designed to cover them should be included.
U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 (1951) [hereinafter Conference of
Plenipotentiaries].
58. For a discussion of the expansive, "safety net" theory of the social
group category, see Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a
Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 39 (1983).
59. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, supra note 57.
19951
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because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the
Government or because the political outlook, antecedents
or economic activity of its members, or the very existence
of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the
Government's policies.... Mere membership of a particu-
lar social group will not normally be enough to substanti-
ate a claim to refugee status. There may, however, be
special circumstances where mere membership can be a
sufficient ground to fear persecution.60
A. The Ninth Circuit
The leading United States case discussing the "social group"
category is Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S.6" In that case, two aliens from
El Salvador petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying their
request for relief from deportation. They claimed that they were
entitled to asylum and prohibition of deportation because they
feared persecution as members of a particular social group which
consisted of "young, urban, working class males of military age
who had never served in the military or otherwise expressed sup-
port for the government of El Salvador."62
Struggling to discern the contours of the "social group" cate-
gory, the Sanchez-Trujillo court set forth a four-part test to deter-
mine whether the petitioners had established eligibility for relief
premised on their membership in a social group. First, the court
asked, is the class of people identified by the petitioners cogniza-
ble as a "particular social group" under the immigration statutes?
Second, do the petitioners establish that they themselves quali-
fied as members of that group? Third, has the purported social
group in fact been targeted for persecution on account of the
characteristics of the group members? Finally, are "special cir-
cumstances" present which warrant the regard of "mere member-
ship" in that social group as constituting per se eligibility for
asylum or prohibition of deportation?6"
Considering its "threshold question," whether the class of
young, urban, working class males satisfied the refugee defini-
tion, the court looked to the term "particular social group,"
which appeared in the 1967 Protocol. It then turned to the
60. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, 1
77-79 (1979). Courts generally regard the Handbook as a "useful tool" for
interpreting the provisions of the Protocol. See Zavala-Bonilla v. I.N.S., 730 F.2d
562, 567 (9th Cir. 1984).
61. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
62. Id. at 1573.
63. Id. at 1574-75.
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Handbook, and noted the warning that "'mere membership in a
social group will not normally be enough to substantiate a claim
to refugee status,' absent the existence of 'special circum-
stances.' "64 The court next examined the statutory language
and concluded that while "the 'social group' category is a flexible
one which extends broadly to encompass many groups who do
not otherwise fall within the other categories of race, nationality,
religion, or political opinion, . . . the scope of the term cannot be
without some outer limit."
65
Attempting to define this outer limit, the Sanchez-Trujillo
court individually examined the words "particular" and "social
group." Because the word "group" is modified by the words "par-
ticular" and "social," the court decided, a "collection of people
closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some com-
mon impulse or interest" is implied.66 It then emphasized that
"of central concern is the existence of a voluntary associational
relationship among the purported members which imparts some
common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a
member of that discrete social group."67 The court suggested
that a prototypical example of a " 'particular social group' would
be the immediate members of a certain family, the family being a
focus of fundamental affiliational concerns and common inter-
ests for most people."6.
Ultimately, the Sanchez-Trujillo court held that
such an all-encompassing grouping as the petitioners iden-
tiff simply is not that type of cohesive, homogeneous group
to which we believe the term 'particular social group' was
intended to apply... To hold otherwise would be tanta-
mount to extending refugee status to every alien displaced
by conditions of unrest or violence in his or her home
country.
69
64. d. at 1576 (quoting HANDBOOK, supra note 60, 1 79).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. IM
68. Id. Ironically, in a later case, Estrada-Posadas v. I.N.S., 924 F.2d 916
(9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit rejected an asylum applicant's claim that
persecution based on her membership in a certain family could satisfy the
"social group" category. The court specifically rejected the very notion it
advanced in Sanchez-Trujillo (the family as a prototypical example of a social
group), holding: "[The petitioner] cites no case that extends the concept of
persecution of a social group to the persecution of a family, and we hold it does
not. If Congress had intended to grant refugee status on account of 'family
membership,' it would have said so." Id. at 918-19.
69. 801 F.2d at 1577.
1995]
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The Sanchez-Trujillo decision, then, in attempting to define
the outer limits of the "social group" category, requires that
applicants claiming persecution due to their membership in such
a group emphasize the group's cohesiveness and the characteris-
tics that are common to their particular group.
B. The Board of Immigration Appeals
The BIA has given a different, and therefore precedentially
confusing, meaning of "social group." Its most thorough analysis
of the meaning of "social group" appears in Matter of Acosta.7
0
Acosta, a Salvadoran man, claimed that he feared persecution in
his country based on his membership in a social group com-
prised of taxi drivers and persons engaged in the transportation
industry in El Salvador. Acosta belonged to a group. known as
COTAXI, one of five taxi cooperatives in the city of San Salvador
and one of many such cooperatives throughout the country. He
presented evidence to the BIA that anti-government guerrillas
had subjected him and other members of COTAXI to physical
violence and death threats.71
Evaluating Acosta's "social group" claim, the BIA first
applied a purely linguistic analysis, and decided that the term
could encompass people who endure persecution because they
have a "certain relation, or having a certain degree of similarity
to one another or people of like class or kindred interests, such
as shared ethnic, cultural, or linguistic origins, education, family
background, or perhaps economic activity."72 Next, like the
Sanchez-Trujillo court, the BIA turned to the Handbook's language,
and emphasized that "social group" status frequently appears in
combination with persecution on other grounds such as race,
religion, or nationality.
73
Finally, the BIA applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis - "of
the same kind" - to deduce the meaning of "social group." The
doctrine of ejusdem generis holds that "general words used in an
enumeration with specific words should be construed in a man-
ner consistent with the specific words."7 4 In Acosta, the BIA
determined that since the other categories for which asylum can
be granted describe persecution "aimed at an immutable charac-
teristic," persecution on account of membership in a particular
70. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
71. Id. at 216-17.
72. Id. at 232-33 (quoting G. GooDwiN-GiLL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1983)).
73. Id
74. Id.
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social. group means "persecution that is directed toward an indi-
vidual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a
common immutable characteristic. "' Ultimately, the BIA held
that because the characteristics of the group in which Acosta
claimed membership were not immutable, he had "not shown
that the conduct he feared was 'persecution on account of a
membership in a social group,'" and his claim necessarily
failed.76
Acosta's inability to demonstrate the immutability of his
characteristics directly resulted in the BIA's rejection of his social
group claim. As a result, Acosta's "immutability" requirement is
the necessary core of a social group claim before the BIA: In that
case, the BIA defined an immutable characteristic as one which
the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
identities or consciences. Only when this is the case does the fact of
group membership become something comparable to the other four
grounds of persecution under the Act, namely, something that
either is beyond the power of an individual to change or that is so
fundamental to his identity or conscience that it ought not be
required to be changed. By construing persecution "on
account of membership in a particular social group" in this
manner, we preserve the concept that refuge is restricted
to individuals who are either unable by their own actions,
or as a matter of conscience should not be required, to
avoid persecution.77
Within months after the Acosta decision was entered, the BIA
again aplied its own "social group" test. In Matter of Sanchez and
Escobar, the two applicants claimed membership in a social
group "comprised of young (18 to 30 years of age), urban, work-
ing class males of military age who have not served in the military
or otherwise affirmatively demonstrated their support for the
government of El Salvador." 79 Their appeal from an Immigra-
tion Judge's refusal to withhold their deportation failed, because
they had not established that the persecution they endured was
attributable to their membership in that social group. Explain-
ing its perception of the "social group" requirements, the BIA
stated:
75. Id. (emphasis in original).
76. Id,
77. 1& at 233-34 (emphasis added).
78. 19 I. & N. Dec. 276 (BIA 1985), aff'd sub nom. Sanchez-Trujillo y.
I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
79. Id. at 285.
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[i] t is not enough to simply identify the common character-
istics of a statistical grouping of a portion of the population
at risk. In the context of the asylum and withholding provi-
sions related to 'membership in a particular social group'
under the (Refugee) Act, there must be a showing that the
claimed persecution is on account of the group's identifying char-
acteristics. This the respondents have not shown."0
The decision in Matter of Sanchez and Escobar was appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, which, in Sanchez-Trujillo, affirmed the BIA's deci-
sion, but replaced the BIA's "immutable characteristic" standard
with its own four-part test to justify the outcome.8 1
Acosta's immutability requirement, which will be difficult for
some asylum applicants to meet, is the current standard for the
"sexual orientation" category at the BIA level. Although Acosta
itself was a non-binding decision, on June 16, 1994, United States
Attorney General Janet Reno designated a case that applied the
immutability standard to an orientation-based persecution claim
as binding precedent for the BIA.8 2
Again, the Ninth Circuit's emphasis upon the cognizability
of a particular social group in Sanchez-Trujillo differs from the
BIA's emphasis upon the characteristics of any given group, pro-
ducing precedential confusion. While the Sanchez-Trujillo court's
four-part test tests the validity of the group itself, Acosta and Matter
of Sanchez and Escobar stress the characteristics which lead to the
group's persecution. The inconsistency of these two tests leads
to a crucial question for victims of orientation-based persecution:
which criteria can they satisfy, if any?8"
80. Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
81. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 61-69 and
accompanying text.
82. See Membership in a "Social Group" as Grounds for Asylum, REFUGEE
REPoRTs, June 30, 1994, at 13.
In Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, Interim Dec. No. 3222 (BIA 1990), a case that
the BIA initially did not designate as precedential, a gay Cuban man received
asylum based on his sexual orientation when the government ordered him to
leave the country or be jailed, and to "register" his sexual orientation with the
authorities. Upholding the Immigration Judge's decision, the BIA noted the
failure of the INS to challenge the finding that homosexuality is an
"immutable" characteristic. Further, Toboso-Alfonso successfully alleged that
his registration as a homosexual by the Cuban government was also an
immutable characteristic.
83. Courts outside the Ninth Circuit have stressed different factors in
determining whether an individual is a member of a particular social group, but
they have failed to establish a formal test. See Ellen Vagelos, Comment, The
Social Group That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Should Homosexuals Constitute a
Particular Social Group for Purposes of Obtaining Refugee Status?, 17 FoiRDH" Irr'L
L.J. 229, 251 & n.180 (1993). See, e.g., Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660 (2nd Cir.
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V. ORIENTATION-BASED PERSECUTION CLAIMS: IMPLICATIONS OF
THE SANC-IEZ-TRUILLO AND ACOSTA ANALYSES
As Part II of this Article explains, an alien who is denied
asylum may appeal to the BIA and to the federal court system.
Given the discrepancy between the BIA's interpretation of "social
group" and that of the Ninth Circuit,84 an alien must carefully
characterize the evidence which supports his or her claim of asy-
lum. Ninth Circuit asylum applicants who claim orientation-
based persecution must satisfy Sanchez-Trujillo's four-part "group
identity" test. Applied to such applicants, the test requires that
the petitioners firmly establish that homosexuals (or perceived
homosexuals, whether the perception is accurate or not), are
"homogeneous" and "closely affiliated," with a "common impulse
or interest."
8 5
While actual and perceived homosexuals do indeed possess
a "common impulse or interest," namely, the actual or perceived
desire to engage in sexual conduct with members of their own
sex,86 there are consequences to the statement that homosexuals
are a homogeneous group. Such an assertion is not only inaccu-
rate, but also perpetuates stereotypes about homosexual per-
sons.87 To satisfy the Sanchez-Trujillo test and ultimately receive
asylum based on his or her membership in a particular social
group, a homosexual applicant may effectively have to renounce
his or her individuality, and thereby succumb to the factfinder's
preconceived notions about the general characteristics of homo-
sexuals. These preconceptions, unfortunately, could quite possi-
bly disfavor homosexuals as a group because of. their
stereotypical, rather than individual, traits.
In addition to the surrender of his or her individuality, a
victim of orientation-based persecution also must prove "close
affiliat(ion)" with other members of the "social group." While
1991) (finding the persecutor's perception of the social group important as to
determining whether a particular social group exists).
84. The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit which has devised a specific test
for "membership in a particular social group."
85. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
86. "Homosexual" is defined as "of or characterized by sexual inclination
toward those of the same sex." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 871 (2d. ed. 1983).
87. In fact, many advocates for homosexuals insist:
[T]here is no general model that applies to the effective organization
of same-sex lovers throughout the world.... There is no such thing as
the lesbian or the gay man. Same-sex lifestyles differ from place to
place and from time to time, each with its own advantages and
disadvantages.
THIRD PINK BooK, supra note 42, at 18.
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this may be uncomplicated for an applicant who can prove his or
her membership in a well-known gay rights group analogous to
the United States' "Act Up" and "Queer Nation" organizations
(which membership might better support an applicant's claim of
persecution based on political opinion rather than on member-
ship in a particular social group), the "close affiliation" require-
ment is problematic for applicants who, like Marcelo Tenorio,
are simply targeted for abuse because they are perceived as
homosexual by their appearance or behavior.
The Ninth Circuit suggests a strict interpretation of its "close
affiliation" requirement, offering the family as a "prototypical
example of a particular social group.""8 Explaining why a court
could readily recognize the immediate members of a certain fam-
ily as a "particular social group," the Sanchez-Trujillo court rea-
soned that the family is "a focus of fundamental affiliational
concerns and common interests for most people."89 Impor-
tantly, the court admitted the inadequacy of its own test, stating
that while a family could be recognized as a "particular social
group" because it is a " 'small, readily identifiable group,' " larger
groups with common characteristics, "even if they are at a greater
risk of persecution than a family," could not be likewise consid-
ered.9" The Ninth Circuit has been criticized for this statement,
which apparently subordinates less-easily identified groups to eas-
ily recognizable groups, even when the former groups suffer
more serious persecution.
91
Homosexuals are one of those groups which are at great risk
of persecution, yet cannot satisfy the Ninth Circuit's test because
of their numerosity. The size of the gay population in the United
States and in international communities is, like the immutability
issue, undecided even today. Whatever the size of the gay popu-
88. Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). But see
Estrada-Posadas v. I.N.S., 924 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting an asylum
applicant's claim that membership in a certain family constitutes "membership
in a particular social group.").
89. Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
90. Id, citing Hernandez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985)
(emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Vagelos, supra note 83, at 250-51:
Although the court in Sanchez-Trujillo stressed voluntary association
as the cornerstone of its analysis, some commentators argue that
immutability was an underlying factor in the court's decision. This
argument relies on the fact that the court offered a family as an
example of a particular social group and that, generally, membership
in a family is involuntary. Furthermore, the purported social group in
Sanchez-Trujillo was defined in terms of age, sex, and class; such
characteristics are not easily subject to manipulation by members of
the purported social group.
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lation in this country or in others, the number of hate crimes
against gays nonetheless establishes that the size of the group
which suffers orientation-based persecution is nowhere near as
small as the number of people in an immediate family.92 Proving
membership in a particular social group, as Sanchez-Trujillo
requires, is therefore a formidable, and, in many cases, an impos-
sible task for actual and perceived homosexuals.9"
Just as the Ninth Circuit's four-part test presents an insur-
mountable hurdle for many who withstand orientation-based
persecution, so too is the BIA's "immutable characteristics"
approach an awkward fit for this type of "social group" claim.
That his or her identifying characteristics are "immutable," which
is the indispensable foundation of a BIA "social group" claim, is
difficult for a homosexual to prove, given the current scientific
debate over whether homosexuality is innate (or fixed early in
life) or a matter of choice. 94
If a factfinder is convinced that homosexuality could be
merely a lifestyle of choice, and not one of biological destiny,
Acosta's language may be especially damaging to an asylum appli-
cant claiming persecution based on his or her membership in a
social group comprised of homosexuals. In that decision, the
BIA specifically noted that Acosta's characteristics-eniployment-
as a taxi driver in San Salvador and refusal to participate in guer-
rilla-sponsored work stoppages-were not immutable. It stated:
[T] he members of the group could avoid the threats of the
guerrillas either by changing jobs or by cooperating in
work stoppages. It may be unfortunate that the respon-
dent either would have had to change his means of earn-
ing a living or cooperate with the guerrillas in order to
92. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 39 (compilation of instances
of orientation-based persecution).
93. This Article addresses actual as well as perceived, or "imputed" sexual
orientation because persecution occurs on both grounds. The author
acknowledges that obtaining refugee status on the grounds of "imputed
political opinion" is difficult given the Supreme Court's holding in I.N.S. v.
Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 813 (1992). In that case, Justice Scalia wrote for the
majority that persecution on account of political opinion must be on account of
the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's. However, this Article
concerns persecution based on membership in a social group is comprised of
actual or perceived homosexuals. This form of persecution can be
meaningfully distinguished from persecution based on political opinion,
because social groups emphasize membership in a class or assembly of persons,
while political opinion focuses on an individual's beliefs.
94. See generally David Gelman, Born or Bred, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1992, at
46, cited in WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ED., LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 15-20
(1993); Meredith F. Small, The Gay Debate: Is Homosexuality a Matter of Choice or
Chance?, 12 AMERICAN HEALTH 70 (1993).
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avoid their threats... because the respondent's member-
ship in the group of taxi drivers was something he had the
power to change, so that he was able by his own actions to
avoid the persecution of the guerrillas, he has not shown
that the conduct he feared was "persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group" within our con-
struction of the act.9 5
Strangely, when suggesting that Acosta should have either
quit his job or cooperated with the guerrillas, the BIA did not
specifically determine that his mutable characteristics were
among a list of characteristics that are never "so fundamental to
his identity or conscience that (they) ought not be required to be
changed." Unfortunately, there has been no case in which the
BIA has offered a "laundry list" of characteristics that are, while
not immutable, too integral to an applicant's identity to require
their surrender.9 6 Assuming arguendo that homosexuality is a
lifestyle choice rather than a purely genetic trait, it is uncertain
whether the BIA would consistently regard a person's sexual ori-
entation as a characteristic so "fundamental" that it ought not to
be "changed." Would the BIA regard asking a person to aban-
don his or her sexuality as merely "unfortunate?" Would the BIA
require Marcelo Tenorio to refrain from socializing with other
members of the gay community at bars and other public meeting
places in order to avoid persecution? Without some explicit
statement on homosexuals as a social group from a higher
authority, it is impossible to predict the BIA's outcome on the
issue of whether sexual orientation is fundamental.
97
As the above analyses show, if victims of orientation-based
persecution seek relief from their terror through asylum claims
before the BIA and the Ninth Circuit, they are likely to fail.
When these unsuccessful claimants are deported, the United
States violates the principle of "non-refoulement," which is the
95. Matter of Acosta, 19 I & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
96. In Acosta, the BIA did not explain from what precedent or doctrine its
notion of "fundamental" characteristics derived.
97. In Tenorio, Judge Leadbetter acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's
"voluntariness" requirement, but his decision appears to turn on the
"immutable" nature of sexual orientation. It reads, in part:
There exists a voluntary associational relationship among the
members (of the homosexual social group), and a common
characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of the
social group. Sexual orientation is arguably an immutable
characteristic, and one which an asylum applicant should not be
compelled to change. Thus, homosexuals are considered to be
members of a particular social group.
No. A72 093 558 (EOIR Immig. Court July 26, 1993), at 14.
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very essence of refugee law.9" Thus, if the United States is to
fulfill its international commitment, changes must be imple-
mented to accommodate such victims.
One commentator, Daniel Compton, has suggested that the
necessary change would be a modification of the first factor in
Sanchez-Trujillo's four-part test.99 He would emphasize external
cognizability factors rather than internal ones, and use the fourth
factor - the "special circumstances" element - as a limiting princi-
ple."° To eliminate "weak social group claims," Compton sug-
gests, a court should determine, as the Handbook recommends,
whether "special circumstances" exist which allow recognition of
a claim on the basis of social group membership alone.' 0 '
Despite his optimism that more emphasis on the fourth prong of
the Sanchez-Trujillo test will produce a better result, however,
Compton admits that "[e] xactly what is meant by 'special circum-
stances' is not stated in the Handbook, nor is its meaning clari-
fied by the courts that have cited it."' 02 Ultimately, Compton
offers some examples of what courts should view as "special cir-
cumstances": a historical pattern of the group, a recent shift in
the balance of power making the group vulnerable to a new
regime, or a situation that simply "shocks the conscience of a
decisionmaker."
0 3
Although such a modification of Sanchez-Trujillo might pro-
duce a desirable effect in the Ninth Circuit, this precedent would
not bind the BIA outside the Ninth Circuit, nor would it bind
other federal circuits (the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, for exam-
ple) which must decide numerous asylum appeals.
Not only would the Ninth Circuit's willingness to broaden its
interpretation of the parameters of "particular social group" be
of limited authoritative benefit, it would also suffer from the
same lack of guidance it exhibited in Sanchez-Trujillo if the court
attempted to use the fourth prong as a "weed-out" factor.
Neither the courts of appeals nor the BIA currently have suffi-
cient guidance to effectively apply the Refugee Act to social
98. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, at art. 33.
99. Compton, supra note 55, at 930. Though Compton views Sanchez-
Trujillo as opening up the door to asylum applicants claiming persecution on
account of social group membership, I would characterize the decision
differently. A more appropriate title for a comment on Sanchez-TrufilUo might
be: "Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: The Ninth Circuit Slams the Door on
Some Groups with its Four-Part Test."





294 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY (Vol. 9
group claims based on sexual. orientation. As noted earlier,
courts routinely give great weight to the Handbook, which advises
that social groups are usually a collection of "persons of similar
background, habits, or social status."10 4 However, as Compton
correctly realizes, the Handbook's instructions regarding social
group membership are terribly vague - it provides no examples
of groups which might be construed as "particular social groups."
Likewise, the Refugee Act itself, which the BIA and the fed-
eral courts are bound to uphold, offers no interpretive gui-
dance- it is simply a "blank check" adaptation of international
obligations into the United States Code. The troubling effect of
Congress' failure to define the terms contained in the Refugee
Act may be acutely observed in Estrada-Posadas v. I.N.S.105 There,
the court relied on Congress' silence about the contours of "par-
ticular social group" to refuse the applicant's "family as a social
group" claim, stating, "[I]f Congress had intended to grant refu-
gee status on account of 'family membership,' it would have said
so."'0 6 Does this not also mean that if Congress had intended to
grant refugee status on account of orientation-based persecution,
it would have said so?
VI. A "CLASSES OF PERSONS" ANALYSIS
Whether Congress intended to grant refugee status to a
"social group" comprised of homosexuals might be determined
by whether homosexuals were among the classes of persons the
Refugee Act intended to protect from persecution. Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor, in her dissent from the Court's opinion in
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic,'0 7 has offered a method for
determining which classes of persons a civil rights statute was
intended to protect. This method can be applied by analogy to
the Refugee Act to show that homosexuals were indeed among
the classes of persons intended for protection by the Act.
In Bray, the respondents, abortion clinics and supporting
organizations, sued to enjoin the petitioners, an association of
individuals who plan antiabortion demonstrations, from demon-
strating at clinics in the Washington, D.C. area. The District
Court held that the petitioners were liable under section
1985(3), the civil rights statute prohibiting conspiracies to
deprive "any person or classes of persons of the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal protection and immunities under the
104. HANDBOOK, supra note 60, 1 77.
105. 924 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1990).
106. IM at 918-19.
107. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
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laws."10 8 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's holding, which enjoined the petitioners from trespassing
on, or obstructing access to specified clinics and ordered the pay-
ment of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988. -
The majority of the United States Supreme Court held that
section 1985(3) does not create a federal cause of action against
persons who demonstrate at abortion clinics. Delivering the
Court's opinion, Justice Scalia determined that the respondents
had not shown, as precedent requires:
(1) that 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based
invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspir-
ators' action,' and
(2) that the conspiracy 'aimed at interfering with rights'
that are 'protected against private, as well as official
encroachment.'10 9
Rejecting the notion of women who seek abortions as the "class"
targeted for discrimination, Justice Scalia stated:
Whatever may be the precise meaning of a 'class' for pur-
poses of [the] speculative extension of § 1985(3) beyond
race, the term unquestionably connotes something more
than a group of individuals who share a desire to engage in
conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors. Other-
wise, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to assert
causes of action under § 1985(3) simply be defining the
aggrieved class as those seeking to engage in the activity
the defendant has interfered with.... The class cannot be
defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious
action. 110
Justice O'Connor, more willing to extend the statute's protection
beyond racial situations, countered Justice Scalia in her dissent
(in which Justice Blackmun joined), declaring: "[The] respon-
dents' injuries and petitioners' activities fall squarely within the
ambit of this statute.""' Advocating a more flexible construction
of the statute, Justice O'Connor noted that
[A]lthough the immediate purpose of § 1985(3) was to
combat animosity against blacks and their supporters, the
language of the Act, like that of many Reconstruction stat-
utes, is more expansive than the historical context that
inspired it. [The statute] speaks in general terms. ...
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
109. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758.
110. Id. at 759 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (citation omitted).
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She further supported her position that section 1985(3) ought to
extend to non-racial discrimination with the Act's legislative
history:
[The Act encoded] Congress' condemnation of private
action against individuals on account of their group affilia-
tion. Perhaps the clearest expression of this intent is
found in the statement of Senator Edmunds, who man-
aged the bill on the floor of the Senate, when he explained
to his colleagues that Congress did not 'undertake in this
bill to interfere with what might be called a private conspir-
acy growing out of a neighborhood feud... [but, if] it
should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this
man because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because
he was a Catholic, of because he was a Methodist, or a
Vermonter,.. . then, this section could reach it.'
113
Justice O'Connor compared the anti-abortion conspiracy in Bray
to the Klan conspiracies which motivated the passage of section
1985(3), explaining that both "intended to hinder a particular
group in the exercise of their legal rights because of their mem-
bership in a specific class."' 14
After establishing that "classes of persons" ought to be read
more generously than it was by the Bray majority, Justice
O'Connor refuted the majority's concern that "classes of per-
sons" would apply to all "victims of tortious action." Referring to
her dissent in Carpenters v. Scott," 5 wherein the majority refused
to extend section 1985(3) to conspiracies motivated by economic
or commercial animus, Justice O'Connor identified the women
seeking the clinics' services as not "simply the victims of tortious
action," but rather, as a group that is singled out, "clearly identifi-
able-by virtue of their affiliation and activities-before any tor-
tious action occurs."' 6
Justice O'Connor's declaration that "clearly identifiable"
groups who are singled out for discrimination "before any tor-
tious action occurs" led to her explanation of what comprises a
"class of persons" for purposes of the Act. At the very least, she
offered, such classes ought to "encompass those classifications
that we have determined merit a heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
7
113. Id. at 800, citing Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871)
(alterations in original).
114. Id. at 801.
115. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
116. Bray, 113 S. CL at 801 (emphasis added).
117. I.
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At this point, because homosexuals, unlike women, are not a
"protected class" for purposes of Equal Protection review, it
might be claimed that the analogy between section 1985(3) and
the Refugee Act is no longer a useful one. However, Justice
O'Connor's mention of groups which receive heightened Equal
Protection review is merely offered as a mandatory minimum,
and thus, the flexibility of section 1985(3) now becomes signifi-
cant. She explains the critical difference between the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, which states that no State shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"
and section 1985(3), which prohibits states from "depriving... any
person or classes of persons of the equal protection of the laws."
"Den [ial]," Justice O'Connor reveals, connotes a withholding of
something not yet afforded, while "depriv[ation]" indicates a
seizure of something already bestowed by the State.'
1 8
This distinction between denial and deprivation, coupled
with the flexible nature of section 1985(3), provides a helpful
clue to whether the Refugee Act was intended to protect homo-
sexuals who are persecuted on account of their membership in a
particular social group. As noted above, the 1951 Convention
sought to protect individuals who were persecuted during World
War II and therefore homosexuals were indeed one of the social
groups intended for protection.119 Further, the flexible nature
of the social group category, like the "classes of persons" lan-
guage in section 1985(3), requires a reading even beyond the
historical context in which the Refugee Act was passed. In fact,
the legislative history of the Convention mirrors that of the stat-
ute at issue in Bray. As noted earlier, the Swedish delegate to the
Convention insisted that persecution directed at refugees in
social groups ought to be addressed;' likewise, Senator
Edmunds contended that section 1985(3) should reach depriva-
tion of equal protection that is motivated by the deprived's mem-
bership in a particular group.' Clearly, the Convention (and
subsequently, the Refugee Act) sought to protect individuals
whose persecutors deprived them of a basic human existence. I
suggest that the "social group" category warrants the elastic analy-
sis that is also appropriate for section 1985(3)'s "classes of
persons."
118. Id
119. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 57.
121. See supra note 116.
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VII. SOCIAL GROUP JURISPRUDENCE IN NoN-U.S. COURTS
As discussed above, Acosta's "immutability" requirement, as
set forth and applied by the BIA, is an unbeatable barrier for
persons who claim persecution on account of their membership
in a particular social group comprised of homosexuals. The
Canadian Supreme Court has, unfortunately, embraced the
immutability requirement so that homosexuals can not qualify
under the "social group" category in that country, either.
122
In Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward,123 the Canadian
Supreme Court evaluated the claim of a former member of the
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a paramilitary terrorist
organization in Northern Ireland, who had been forced to guard
hostages when the organization ordered them executed. Oppos-
ing the execution of his prisoners, Ward allowed them to escape.
As a result, the organization court-martialled him and sentenced
him to death. He fled from Northern Ireland to Canada, where
he applied for asylum and was rejected by the Minister of
Employment and Immigration. After a series of lower-level
appeals, Ward reached the Supreme Court, where he claimed
that he was a refugee according to the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees because of his membership in a particular
social group (past members of the IN[A) and his political opin-
ion that the prisoners ought not to be killed.'
2 4
Although Ward's "political opinion" claim for refugee status
was accepted by the Supreme Court, that body explicitly rejected
his "social group" claim. Citing the Acosta criteria, which derives
from the application of ejusdem generis, the court affirmed its own
"social group" approach:
In finding that [Acosta's] co-operative did not constitute "a
particular social group," the board defined this term in a
manner that reflects classic discrimination analysis . . . "By
construing persecution on account of membership in a
social group in this manner, we preserve the concept that
122. One Canadian administrative tribunal has granted political asylum
on the grounds of orientation-based persecution. In Re: Inaudi, I.R.B. No. T 91-
04459 (Apr. 9, 1992), the Convention Refugee Determination Division (the
"CRDD") of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (the "IRB")
determined that an Argentinean man was entitled to asylum based on the
continuous and abusive treatment he suffered at the hands of the Argentinean
authorities. As an IRB decision, however, this ruling has very little precedential
value.
For a thorough analysis of Inaudi and a comparison of asylum procedures
in the United States and Canada, see Vagelos, supra note 83.
123. 103 D.L.R. 4th 1 (Can. 1993).
124. Id
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refuge is restricted to individuals who are either unable by
their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not
be required, to avoid persecution."
125
Canada's justification for this restrictive approach to social
group jurisprudence echoes Acosta's as well: "Canada's obligation
to offer a haven to those fleeing their homelands is not unlim-
ited." 126 Further, Ward demonstrates Canada's refusal to bear
the refugee burden alone: "Canada should not overstep its role
in the international sphere by having its responsibility engaged
whenever any group is targeted." ' 7 Like the United States and
all Convention obligors, Canada requires guidance to utilize the
"social group" category effectively. In dicta that resembles the
BIA's inept description of "fundamental" characteristics, the
Ward court stated: "[S] urely there are some groups, the affiliation
in which is not so important to the individual that it would be
more appropriate to have the person dissociate him- or herself
from it before Canada's responsibility should be engaged." 2 '
Despite its certainty that these groups "surely" must exist, how-
ever, the Canadian Supreme Court, like the BIA, was not able to
precisely articulate what these groups might be.
VIII. RECOMMENDATION
Estrada-Posadas, Sanchez-Trujillo, Acosta, and Ward confirm
that the courts require specific direction to assist their adjudica-
tion of "social group" claims. A modification of the Sanchez-Tru-
fillo test, even if it were adopted by all the circuits and the BIA,
would not assure any greater adherence to any specific policy
than the original test. I suggest that an the UNHCR must amend
the Handbook in order to ensure an efficient and accurate evalua-
tion of soci 'al group claims. Host countries must do this to honor
their international commitment to "non-refoulement" and to
respond to the widespread instances of orientation-based perse-
cution in international communities. Because judicial bodies in
the United States and in various other host countries 29 consult
the Handbook to evaluate refugee law concepts,3 ° the UNHCR
125. Id. at 32 (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (BIA
1985).
126. Id. at 33.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 33.
129. A "host country" is a country which is in an economic and political
state that enables its government to grant asylum to individuals pursuant to its
international obligations.
130. See Ananeh-Firempong v. I.N.S., 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985)
(describing the Handbook's importance in asylum cases).
1995]
300 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
should clarify its criteria by specifically naming sexual orientation
as an example of a social group.
131
The restrictive approaches to social group recognition which
appear in Sanchez-Trujillo and Matter of Acosta reflect the Ninth
Circuit's and the BIA's concern that the United States alone can-
not accommodate every asylum applicant who demonstrates a
well-founded fear of persecution. The Ninth Circuit and the BIA
correctly realize that there must be a limit to grants of asylum by
the United States. 132 This recognition should not mean, how-
ever, that courts should deny valid "social group" claims; rather,
it mandates that host countries must cooperate in order to satisfy
their common international commitment to victims of orienta-
tion-based persecution.
The author acknowledges that because host countries
undertake great financial responsibilities as they grant refugee
status,33 they must establish a maximum number of refugees.
However, as countries establish these limits, they may not violate
the principle of "non-refoulement." 134 Leon F. Bouvier exam-
ines the need for "outer limits" in U.S. refugee policy with partic-
ularity, discussing the impact of immigration on the
underclass and the labor market, economic growth, cultural
adaptation, and population growth.136 To ease this impact, Bou-
vier recommends that refugee numbers ought to be limited to
50,000 per year. 137 He defends against the concepts of "open
borders" and increased immigration into the United States:
131. In the event that an amendment to the Handbook is not
immediately possible, some alternative statement should be made by the
UNHCR's High Commissioner, who directs her recommendations to all
Convention obligors. This statement could take the form of an Executive
Committee Recommendation similar to the one made for accepting women
who flee gender-based persecution, or as a policy recommendation made in the
High Commissioner's report to the ECOSOC or to the International
Commission of Jurists. A modification of the Handbook is the preferred
alternative because of its quasi-authoritative status among factfinders who make
asylum decisions.
132. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
133. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 14.
135. The term "immigrants" includes three groups: legal immigrants,
refugees, and illegal immigrants. LEON F. BOUVIER, PEACEFUL INVASIONS:
IMMIGRATION AND CHANGING AMERICA 19 (1992).
136. Id. at 59-141.
137. Id. at 200. Bouvier's recommendation that the United States impose
limits of 50,000 refugees and 450,000 total immigrants are based on estimated
population growth in the United States (assuming that the overall fertility rate
is reduced to 1.8). These recommendations, Bouvier states, are consistent with
the Hesburgh Commission. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
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First, unskilled immigrants compete directly and indi-
rectly with disadvantaged American workers for jobs, mak-
ing it harder to solve the problems of the (domestic)
underclass.
Second, the availability of many unskilled immigrants
encourages low-wage and low-tech industries to expand,
when the United States should be developing a high-tech
economy to compete in the global marketplace. . . To
avoid a labor market nightmare of workers not qualified
for the jobs that are available, the United States should
increase its investment in education and training its citi-
zens and reduce admissions of immigrant workers.
Third, while it is true that earlier immigrants did even-
tually adapt to American society, adaptation occurred only
after considerable hostility between the new immigrants
and the resident population.
Fourth, despite claims to the contrary, the (United
States) population is growing, more rapidly than any other
advanced nation.1 38
Even as he observes the necessity for outer limits, however,
Bouvier identifies the need to reject economic refugees, who do
not fear persecution but simply desire to improve their standard
of living through a manipulation of refugee law, as most compel-
ling. Prioritizing those asylum applicants who genuinely fear per-
secution, he affirms that "[r]efugees should qualify under the UN
definition of that term. That is to say that they must be political
refugees with documented proof that their lives would be in dan-
ger if they returned to their homeland."' 9
As Bouvier, the BIA, and the Ninth Circuit correctly warn,
the United States cannot absorb the world's refugees on its own.
Consequently, I propose an amendment to the Handbook itself,
rather than a modification of the Ninth Circuit or the BIA's crite-
POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREsT (1981). See
BOUVIER, supra note 135, at 201.
Bouvier reports that as many as 150,000 refugees have been admitted by
the United States in a single year, and the authorized total has exceeded
130,000 in recent years. Id at 19. In recent years (1985-1987), refugees have
accounted for 16.7 percent of all immigrants. Id. at 76. The INS also reports
astonishing numbers of asylum applications: in 1989, 101,679 cases were
received by that organization, only eighteen percent of which were approved.
In 1990, the INS received 73,621 new cases, with a fifteen percent approval rate.
Id. (quoting REFUGEE REPORTS, July 20, 1990).
138. BOUVIER, supra note 135, at 60.
139. I. at 200 (emphasis in original).
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ria, or even a statutory amendment.1 40 The Handbook is an
appropriate site for this amendment because it guides not only
the United States, but also other host countries which grapple
with their obligations to the world's refugees.
IX. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Currently, the Handbook specifies that the term "particular
social group" refers to "persons of similar background, habits, or
social status." 4 ' On its face, this description appears to include
actual or perceived homosexuals, who have, at least, similar back-
grounds (records of victimization), habits (desire for and, in
some cases, participation in same-sex relations) and social status
(targets of persecution in countries which outlaw, seek to
"change," or otherwise punish homosexuals). Further, the Hand-
book's judgment that "[m] embership of such a particular social
group may be at the root of persecution because . . . the very
existence of the social group itself is held to be an obstacle to the
government's policies" 11 2 could certainly embrace victims of ori-
entation-based persecution, particularly in countries where
"social cleansing" goals lead the government to persecute
homosexuals. 4 '
Despite its language, which seems to suggest recognition of
groups like homosexuals as social groups, the Handbook is cur-
rently not specific enough to overcome the courts' anxiety about
exceeding the "outer limits" of asylum grants. Therefore, the fol-
lowing should be added to the Handbook-
79(a). To honor the obligation of non-refoulement, the
"particular social group" category should be liberally con-
strued to include all classes of persecuted persons who
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on
their membership in a certain group, but cannot attribute
their persecution to their race, religion, nationality, or
political opinion.
79(b) Such classes include, but are not limited to families,
actual or perceived homosexuals, members of particular
class or caste systems, voluntary associations, and gender
140. An amendment to the Handbook could be achieved by presenting a
position paper for consideration by the UNHCR's Executive Committee and
High Commissioner.
141. HANDBOOK, supra note 60, 77.
142. Id., 1 79.
143. See supra note 52.
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groups.' These groups' characteristics shall be regarded,
like race, religion, nationality, and political opinion, as
immutable or so fundamental that they ought not to be
surrendered to avoid persecution. The absence of any par-
ticular class of persons from this list of classes shall not be
interpreted as an exclusion thereof.
X. MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF HOST COUNTRIES: BEYOND THE
TREATY
Although the Protocol's "non-refoulement" provision clearly
mandates that countries not return refugees to countries where
they have a well-founded fear of persecution, these countries are
also bound by the ethical ideal that originally led the Convention
and later the Protocol to protect persecuted persons. Andrew
Shacknove predicates this ideal upon the following "conception":
a) a bond of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance
between the citizen and the state constitutes the normal
basis of society;
b) in the case of the refugee, this bond has been severed;
c) persecution and alienage are always the physical mani-
festations of this severed bond; and
d) these manifestations are the necessary and sufficient
conditions for determining refugeehood.' 4 5
Shacknove asserts that this conception, because it "posits the
existence of a normal, minimal relation of rights and duties
between the citizen and the state, the negation of which endan-
gers refugees," is a moral claim.'
4 6
Shacknove charges that the international community's
response to its moral calling has been "clumsy."147 He attributes
this moral default to, among other factors, sovereign states'
reluctance "in assuming the burdens of material relief, asylum,
and resettlement." 14 Like Bouvier,' 4 9 Shacknove worries that a
"floodgates" approach to refugee issues would "financially
exhaust relief programs,"' 5 0 but he additionally supports the
establishment of "outer limits" through a reminder that "an
144. For a discussion of why courts should specifically recognize
categories in addition to homosexuals as social groups, see JAMEs C. HATHAWAY,
THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 162-69 (1991).
145. Andrew Shacknove, Who Is a Refugee?, 95 ETHiCS 274, 275. (Jan.
1985).
146. Id
147. Id at 276.
148. Id
149. See supra notes 136-40.
150. Shacknove, supra note 148, at 276.
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overly inclusive conception (of the refugee definition) is also
morally suspect and will ... impugn the credibility of the refu-
gee's privileged position among host populations, whose support
is crucial for the viability of international assistance programs."151
Shacknove's ultimate recommendation, a new definition of
"refugee," is overinclusive. That definition includes "persons
whose basic needs are unprotected by their country of origin,
who have no remaining recourse other than to seek international
restitution of their needs, and who are so situated that interna-
tional assistance is possible."1"2 Yet, Shacknove's discussion of
"the minimal social bond" which underpins refugee status is
important to this discussion.15 Quoting Hobbes, Shacknove
declares that
the sine qua non of the political commonwealth is to defend
the citizen 'from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries
of one another'... To be minimally legitimate, and tolera-
ble, the Commonwealth must reduce the citizen's vulnera-
bility to others, all others... The sovereign must, at least,
protect the citizen from foreign invasion and the 'injuries of
one another,' which include civil war, genocide, terrorism,
torture, and kidnapping, whether perpetrated by state
agents or others.
154
As Part IV of this Article discusses,1 55 the currently reported
homophobia-induced incidents of persecution are in fact the
"injuries of one another" from which Shacknove argues govern-
ments must protect their citizens. When governments disregard
or fail to protect their citizens from such injuries, then, a "nega-
tion" of those "normal, minimal rights and duties" occurs, thus
triggering the victims' right to refugee status.
Modern refugee law commentators have specifically recog-
nized the United States' moral commitment to granting asylum
when applicants targeted for persecution show that their govern-
ments have failed to protect them. As LauraJ. Deitrich explains,
[T] he United States is morally committed to grant asylum,
in accordance with our laws, to individuals who demon-
strate a well-founded fear of persecution in their own coun-
try because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
151. 1& Shacknove contends that refugees, because they receive
"entitlements" from their host countries, are in a "privileged position" among
persons facing disaster.
152. Id at 277.
153. Id. at 277.
154. I. at 278-79 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN 142 (Bobbs-
Merrill Co. 1958)) (emphasis added).
155. See supra notes 40-54.
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particular social group, or political opinion. America's
openness to refugees - people fleeing from persecution in
other parts of the world - is one of this nation's most cher-
ished traditions, and it has been enshrined in our national
law. 156
Mark Gibney demonstrates this "moral commitment" by identify-
ing the moral obligations contained in the amended Refugee
Act.15 ' According to Gibney, the Refugee Act158 "intended to
make humanitarian concerns, rather than political [ones], para-
mount.159 He astutely observes that the Refugee Act itself is
"replete with language and standards that can best be described
as 'moral.' "160 More importantly, he realizes, moral imperatives
are found not only in the Act's preamble, but also in its substan-
tive sections. 1 '
After describing the moral foundation which underlies the
letter of the law in the Refugee Act, Gibney identifies the need
for the federal judiciary to implement the Act's humanitarian
objectives. Tracing the judiciary's past record of "passivity" and
"great reluctance to address immigration or refugee issues (for
fear of interfering) with 'political' issues," he concludes that
"without judicial participation, moral or ethical concerns may
not receive a hearing."162
156. Laura J. Deitrich, United States Asylum Policy, in THE NEw ASYLUM
SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980s 67 (David A. Martin, ed., 1988).
157. Mark Gibney, The Refugee Act of 1980: A Humanitaian Standard, 21
GONZ. L. REv. 585 (1985).
158. See supra note 12.
159. Gibney, supra note 157, at 591.
160. Id. at 588. Gibney points to the Refugee Act's "Purpose" section,
which reads in relevant part:
The Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United States
to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in
their homelands. I.N.A. § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1521 note (1988).
Further, he notes that the same section states:
[T]he objectives of this Act are to provide a permanent and
systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees
of special humanitarian concern to the United States.
I.N.A. § 101(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1521 note (1988).
161. Gibney, supra note 157, at 589. As an example, Gibney notes that
the number of refugees admitted into the United States per year may be
increased beyond the prescribed number "if this larger number can be
'justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest.'"
I.N.A. § 207(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1) (1988).
162. Gibney, supra note 157, at 600. Indeed, Gibney explains, "[TIhe
involvement of the courts with this (humanitarian) aspect of the Refugee Act,
which goes to the very heart of the Act itself, might well prompt the political
branches to pay more attention than the 'lip service' attention to humanitarian
concerns heretofore given." Id. at 601.
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Gibney's suggestion that the judiciary will make a difference
in fulfilling the Refugee Act's moral imperatives is correct. Judge
Vela of the Southern District of Texas honored both the letter
and the spirit of the Refugee Act in a 1982 case where he insisted
that federal prison officials inform aliens of their right to apply
for political asylum before initiating their deportation.163 Identi-
fying, as Gibney and Deitrich have, the moral command of the
Refugee Act, judge Vela concluded:
Providing refuge to those facing persecution in their
homeland... goes to the very heart of the principles and
moral precepts upon which this country and its Constitu-
tion were founded. . . To let these same principles go
unprotected would amount to nothing less than a
sacrilege.'"
Judge Leadbetter's compassionate response to Marcelo
Tenorio's suffering further demonstrates the important role
which judges can play in accomplishing the moral purposes of
the Refugee Act.165 Yet until judges who preside over asylum
cases receive definitive guidance about the social group category,
the "shunning of moral o.r humanitarian concerns" will truly, as
Gibney warns, "retard this country's moral advancement."166
XI. THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
Violence against homosexuals is often justified as a "punish-
ment" for a crime against state or religious morality. 67 Appro-
priate vehicles to discourage such violence are not limited to
governmental policies, but even can exist in the pastoral policies
of the very religions which condemn homosexual behavior.
The Roman Catholic Church is among those religious
groups which unequivocally condemn homosexual behavior.
The Bible excludes homosexuals from the "Chosen People" 16
and names as sinners those who engage in homosexual acts. 169
For a discussion of the judiciary's obligations to implement international
law protections for aliens and refugees, see Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of
U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under International Human Rights Law, 100
YALE L.J. 2335 (1991).
163. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed,
692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
164. 537 F. Supp. at 587.
165. See supra note 1.
166. Gibney, supra note 157, at 601.
167. See supra note 46.
168. 18 Leviticus 22 (New Jerusalem Bible). See also 20 Leuiticus 13 (New
Jerusalem Bible).
169. 1 Timothy 10 (NewJerusalem Bible).
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Yet, despite this absolute condemnation of homosexual acts
(which appears in every official document published by the Cath-
olic Church on the subject of homosexuality,' 0 ) Pope John Paul
II has issued a letter which specifically and expressly condemns
the very type of orientation-based persecution suffered by asylum
applicants like Marcelo Tenorio.
In his 1986 "Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on
the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons," Pope John Paul II
stated:
It is deplorable that homosexual persons have been and
are the object of violent malice in speech or in action.
Such treatment deserves condemnation from the Church's
pastors whenever it occurs. It reveals a kind of disregard
for others which endangers the most fundamental princi-
ples of a healthy society. The intrinsic dignity of each per-
son must always be respected in word, in action and in
law.'
7 1
Host countries, I suggest, can learn from the Roman Catholic
Church's official denunciation of orientation-based persecution
and, through compassionate asylum policy, can respect the
"intrinsic dignity of each person," "in word, in action and in law."
XII. CONCLUSION
Orientation-based persecution is a genuine and growing
threat to homosexuals in numerous countries. There exists a
mandate in refugee law's philosophical underpinnings as well as
a framework in its governing treaties for the protection of the
victims of this form of persecution; however, no single host coun-
try can, or should undertake this burden on its own.
170. See J. GORDON MELTON, ED., THE CHURCHES SPEAK ON
HOMOSEXUAL1Y OFFICIAL STATEMENTS FROM RELIGIOUS BODIES AND
ECUMENICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1991). These documents include Principles to
Guide Confessors in Questions of Homosexuality (1973); Declaration of Certain
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics (1975); Archbishop John Quinn, A Pastoral
Letter on Homosexuality (1980); Catholic Social Welfare Commission, An
Introduction to the Pastoral Care of Homosexual People (1981); Bishops of
Massachusetts, Statement on Rights for Homosexuals" (1984); Sacred
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic
Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (1986); Cardinal Joseph
Bernadin, Statement on the Evening Mass at St. Sebastian and Ministy to
Homosexuals (1988).
171. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to the
Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons (1986), in
MELTON, supra note 170, 1 1 10.
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This Article's proposed amendment to the widely consulted,
UN-administered Handbook will confirm that all Protocol obligors
must provide refuge to victims of orientation-based persecution.
Importantly, the amendment's incorporation of international
approaches to the "social group" category assures that the Hand-
book's recommendations will easily adapt to existing social group
jurisprudence. In addition to satisfying jurisprudential concerns,
because it encourages cooperation among host countries, the
proposed amendment complements, rather than frustrates, the
United States INS' recently stated goals for asylum reform.
When consistently and proportionally shared among host coun-
tries, recognition of orientation-based mistreatment as a valid
form of persecution does in fact comply with the ideals of
increased compassion and control.
